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INTERACTIONS OF DIVIDEND AND INVESTMENT
DECISIONS UNDER DIFFERENT GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES:
A SIGNALLING-THEORY APPROACH
Abstract
Based upon the signalling theory, the interactions of dividend and
investment decisions are investigated. A new model is developed by
integrating and generalizing the models used in previous studies.
Effects of growth opportunities are explicitly introduced in this new
model. The error component model is used to improve the efficiency of
estimators. The results suggest that for high-growth firms the
desire to pay reasonable dividends is not adversely affected by invest-
ment decisions, while for low growth firms investment decisions do af-
fect dividend decisions.

INTERACTIONS OF DIVIDEND AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS
UNDER DIFFERENT GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES: A
SIGNALLING-THEORY APPROACH
Introduction
The interactions of investment policy and dividend policy have been
concerned by Spies [23], Faraa [9], Dhrymes and Kurz [8], Miller and
Modigliani [19] and others. Two theories exist in the literature re-
garding the relationships between investment and dividend decisions.
The first, based on the perfect capital market theorem, suggests that
investment decisions and dividend decisions of firms are not related
since, in a perfect capital market, optimal investment decisions by a
firm are independent of how such decisions are financed. The second,
based on the assumption of imperfect capital markets, proposes that they
are negatively related since dividends and investment are competing uses
of limited internal funds. Dhrymes and Kurz [8] and Fama [9] have
developed simultaneous equation models to test these two extreme hypoth-
eses and obtain entirely different empirical results.
A serious problem which exists in previous studies is the implicit
assumption that the firms behave homogeneously regarding dividend and
investment decisions; every study tries to prove the validity of one or
the other theory for all of the firms concerned. With the heterogeneity
of firms, it is doubtful that firms will behave in the same way with
regard to investment and dividend decisions. One important factor which
might affect firms' behavior is growth orientation of firms. In invesi-
gating the relationship between stock price and the changes of divi-
dends, Shiller [22] argues that the growth factor is an important factor
2to be concerned. Two opposing arguments can be found which relate
growth orientations of firms to their dividend- investment decisions.
The first suggests that dividend and investment decisions might not be
related for high growth firms, while they are negatively related for low
growth firms. According to this theory, if a firm commits itself to
rapid growth, a great amount of investment will be needed and internal
funds alone are usually insufficient. In order to develop and maintain
a good capital market relationship and signal future earnings potential
so that external funds are more obtainable, the firm is likely to pay
higher dividends than otherwise although the investment demand for the
same source of funds is great (see Ross, [21]). There is an interesting
argument by Miller and Modigliani [19] that dividend disbursals convey
information to the market on the future potential profitability of a
firm. Bhattacharya [4, 5] uses a signalling-theory approach to explain
firms' dividend-payment decisions. For high-growth firms, therefore,
investment and dividends are less likely to be negatively related. On
the other hand, for firms with relatively little growth potential which
need less outside funds, dividend and investment are likely to be nega-
tively related since they are competing uses of internal funds.
The second theory suggests, however, that dividend and investment
decisions are also negatively related for high-growth firms. Since high
growth adversely impacts the liquidity position of firms, low dividend
payouts shall be associated with those firms (see, for example, Weston
and Brigham [25]). In addition, high growth rates imply high profit
potentiality, which in turn inspires that earnings be retained rather
than distributed to stockholders, whose investment alternatives might
3not offer higher returns. High-growth firms can also attract capital-
gains oriented investors who are in high income brackets and are more
interested in taking their income in the form of capital gain rather
than as dividends, which are subjected to higher income tax rates. For
high-growth firms, therefore, dividend and investment decisions should
also be negatively related.
Such competing theories regarding the effect of growth orientations
on dividend-investment decisions have never been tested empirically in
financial studies. The purpose of this study is to investigate empiri-
cally the difference in behaviors between high-growth and low-growth
firms with regard to dividend and investment decisions. The high-growth
and low-growth firms will be formed into two separate groups with sepa-
rate regression equations estimated. It is recognized in this paper
that, in addition to growth orientation, many other factors may also
affect decisions of a specific firm. It is thus impractical to try to
develop a model capable of explaining different situations which lead to
decisions of specific firms regarding dividend and investment. In this
study, the effect of growth and dividend signalling on the average
behavior of firms will be analyzed from results obtained from pooled
cross-sectional and time-series data. In the next section, a theo-
retical model for the study of the relationship between dividend and
investment decisions of firms will be developed. In the third section,
methods for estimating pooled cross-sectional and time-series data will
be introduced. Empirical results will be given and analyzed in the
fourth section. In the final section, a brief summary and conclusion
will be given.
I. The Model
In this section, a model used in previous studies will first be in-
troduced and commented upon briefly. An alternative model for the study
of relationships between dividend and investment decisions of firms will
then be derived.
Among studies on dividend behaviors of firms, the partial adjust-
ment model suggested by Lintner [16] has most often been used. Suppose
there are observations on N firms over T periods of time. The Lintner
model can be written in terms of the following two equations:
4 = °1 P it + \t (1A)
AD
±t
= y(D*
t
- D
± t_1)
< y 1 1 (IB)
i = 1, 2, . .
.
, N
t = 1, 2, ... , T
where D. is the dividend of firm i in period t, P. is the profit ofit r ' it r
*
the same firm in the same period, n is a disturbance term, D is the
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equilibrium (or desired) value of D. a., and y are parameters to be
estimated. The coefficient of adjustment y should be greater than zero
and less than or equal to one and a., is a positive fraction.
Combining equations (1A) and (IB), the following estimable equation
can be obtained:
ADit
= Ya
l
P
it " Y°i, t-1
+ £ it (2)
where e.^ = YH.^. To study possible effect of investment on dividend,it it J r
changes in capital stock, AK. , can be added to equation (1A) with a
coefficient a„ as
5D. = a,P. + ct„AK. + n. (1A')
it 1 it 2 it it
Equation (1A) defines the optimal dividends as the function of the cur-
rent earnings and equation (1A') defines the optimal dividend as the
function of both earnings and investment opportunity. Hence equation
(1A') is a generalized specification for equation (1A) . Substituting
equation (1A') into (2) we obtain
AD.
t
= Y a1
P.
t
+ Y a2
AK_
t
- YD^ ^ + e±t (3)
in which yct~ indicates the short-run effect of AK on AD and a_ is the
long-run effect. Due to contradictory theories regarding the relation-
ship between investment and dividend decisions of firms as discussed in
the preceding section, the sign of a„ cannot be resolved a priori and
can only be determined empirically. If ct„ is estimated to be negative
and statistically significant, dividend and investment of firms are
proved to be negatively related and hence the assumption of imperfect
capital markets is supported. Otherwise, they are unrelated and hence
the implication of the perfect capital market theorem cannot be re-
jected. Equation (3) is identical to one of the basic equations used by
Faraa [8] for the study of dividend and investment decisions. However,
the basic assumptions used to derive the model are different. Fama [8]
bases on the assumption of interdependency between D. and AK to
derive equation (3) . However, we use an identity similar to that used
by Miller and Modigliani [19] and indicated in equation (4) below to
derive equation (3)
:
D. = P. - AK. + F. (4)it it it it
where F. is the amount of external financing; P. and AK. are the sameit it it
as defined in the previous equations. This equation implies that the
dividends payments can be affected by earnings, net investments and
amount of external financing.
The relationship between AK. and F. is generally used to deter-
mine whether internal financing or external financing is the major
source of new investment. If F. is equal to AK. , then the investmentit M it
decision will not affect the dividend decision. If F. is smaller than
xt
AK. , then the investment decision will have negative impact to the
dividend payment. These arguments do not explicitly take into account
the potential "information content" dividend-decision behavior as sug-
gested by Miller and Modigliani [19]. If the managers use dividend
changes to signal the potential future earnings of their firms, then the
increase of new investments might also increase a firm's dividend pay-
ment. To accomplish this strategy, a manager can use more external
sources of funds to finance their new investments. Hence the estimated
a„ can be used as an indicator of examining the trade off between the
relative importance of dividend signalling and flotation cost. For high
growth firms, the dividends signalling is generally more important than
the consideration of flotation cost and the estimated a~ will generally
be positive. For low growth firms, the dividend signalling is generally
not as important as the consideration of flotation cost. The estimated
a j will generally be negative as predicted by imperfect market theorists.
The specification of equation (3) , however, is biased against
possible negative relationship between dividend and investment of a
firm. If a firm enjoys greater profits in a year, it is likely that
7both dividends paid out and investment of the firm will be increased,
and vice versa. Especially due to inflation, AD, P and AK are even more
likely to move in the same direction if undeflated data are used. Due
to multicollinearity between P and AK, the estimated parameters might
also be subject to large sampling errors.
To avoid such specification problems, equation (1A) and (IB) can be
rewritten in terms of dividend payout ratio (D /P . ) and the ratio of
investment to earnings (AK. /P. )
:
D . \ * AK
.
P^ = 3 o + S l
"pf
+n it (5)ity it
D. \ /D. \ * D.it I
_ f Xt \ l, t-1
where 6 and B, are identical to a, and a„ in equation (1A'). By com-
o l i z
bining equations (5) and (6) , the following estimable equation can be
obtained.
AK. D. .
a It 1, t-1 /7 .
y + By -p- - Y y—— + e (7)
it i, t-1
Since both dividend and investment are normalized by earnings, the
specification of equation (7) is no longer biased against possible
negative relationship between dividend and investment. If a firm earns
more profit in a year, both D. /P. and AK. /P. are not necessarily tor J it it it it
increase at the same time although both D and AK. are likely to be
greater. If a firm primarily depends on internal funds for investment,
then as AK. /P. increases, D. /P. is likely to decrease, and viceit it it it
8versa. Hence these two variables of this firm are likely to be nega-
tively related. On the other hand, if a firm raises the payout ratio or
holds it constant in order to maintain a good capital market relation-
ship for attracting outside funds for investment, D. /P. and AK. /P. ofr °
' it it it it
this firm might move in the same direction or show no relationship at
all. In addition, since both dividend and investment are expressed as a
ratio to profits, inflation can no longer produce spurious correlation
between dependent and explanatory variables. By reducing one explana-
tory variable, the multicollinearity probelm in equation (4) is also
reduced. Equation (7) is the basic structure to be estimated in this
study. According to this specification, S,y is the short-run effect of
changes in investment-earnings ratio on the dividend payout ratio and 8..
is the long-run effect.
Before discussion methods of estimating equation (7) , the simulta-
neous-equation problems between investment and dividend decisions should
be addressed briefly. As mentioned above, there exist two important
studies in the literature which apply simultaneous-equation models to
investigate the relationship between dividend and investment decisions
of firms. The results obtained are extremely diverse. By applying two-
stage least squares (2SLS) and three-stage least squares (3SLS) to
cross-sectional data for individual firms, Dhrymes and Kurz [8] have
found that investment decisions and dividend decisions of firms are
negatively and significantly related. If ordinary least squares (OLS)
were applied to each equation, however, the conclusions obtained would
have been much different. By applying OLS and 2SLS to time-series data
for each of the 298 firms, Fama [9] on the other hand has found that
9dividend and investment decisions of firms are either not statistically
related or positively related for most of the firms studied. He has
also found that 2SLS estimates do not generally perform better than OLS
in terms of prediction errors and t-statistics. He suggests that there
is no evidence requiring the treatment of dividend and investment deci-
sions as interdependent endogenous variables in a simultaneous-equation
model.
As is well known among econometricians, the OLS method is more
robust against specification errors than many of the simultaneous-
3
equation methods. When specification errors exist in the equations,
OLS estimates may be more reliable than those of 2SLS or 3SLS. If a
simultaneous-equation model is well specified and hence the predeter-
mined variables chosen can account substantially for the variation of
the endogenous variables, according to Maddala [17, p. 241], 2SLS
estimates should not be too far from those of OLS. In their studies,
Fama [9] and Dhrymes and Kurz [8] have found that 2SLS estimates are
much different from those of OLS. Such results probably are indications
that specification errors exist in the simultaneous-equation models
estimated.
The specification errors most likely lie in the investment function
rather than in the dividend equation. For dividends, the partial ad-
justment model of John Lintner [16] has stood up well in the literature.
According to theoretical and empirical studies on investment behaviors
of firms, however, desired investment of a firm is primarily affected by
profits of investment, which in turn primarily depend on sales and
4interest rates. The availability of internal funds might be a factor,
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but is not the major factor, affecting investment decisions of firms.
By forcing a dividend variable into the investment equation and over-
emphasizing the simultaneity between dividend and investment, the model
created is likely to contain specification errors. To avoid such
problems in this study, simultaneous-equation estimation methods are not
adopted.
II. Estimation Methods
As mentioned in the first section, the firms covered in this study
are highly heterogeneous. There are different factors which affect the
dividend and investment decisions of firms. It is very difficult, if
not impossible, to specify a single model capable of reflecting dif-
ferent factors affecting the behaviors of firms. If relevant variables
are omitted from a regression equation, as is well known in econometrics,
the estimates obtained are likely to be biased. The time-series of each
firm is too short to allow the estimation of an equation for each firm
with adequate variables and degrees of freedom. Desirable results,
therefore, can not be obtained if an equation is estimated for each
firm. In this study, cross-sectional and time-series data are pooled in
regression to overcome the problem of insufficient degrees of freedom.
The error component model is used to taken into account the effect of
omitted variable on the estimated coefficients. According to the model
suggested by Balestra and Nerlove [2] and Wallace and Hussain [24] } the
error term in Equation (7) can be written in terms of the sum of three
components:
e. - w. + v + u. t (8)i i t it
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where w. represents time invariant, unobserved firm effects, v
ft
repre-
sents firm invariant, unobserved time effects on the dividend payout
ratio of a firm,
3
and u. represents the remaining effects which are
assumed to vary in both cross-section and time dimensions.
One way to estimate the parameters in equation (7) is to treat w^
and v as constants. Under the assumption that u. are independent with
zero means and constant variances, least squares regression of A (D^ /P it )
on AK /P and D. , /P . , and firm and time dummies can be used toit it i, t-1 l, t-1
estimate the parameters. This approach is known as the least squares
with dummy variable technique (LSDV) . As indicated by Maddala [17], the
use of the dummy variable technique may eliminate a major portion of the
variation among both the dependent and explanatory variables if the
between firm and between time-period variation is large. In addition,
in some cases, there is also a loss of a substantial number of degrees
of freedom. Hence LSDV may not be an efficient method of estimation.
Another approach to deal with equation (7) is to treat w^ and v in
equation (8) as random. In this case, instead of N w's and T v's, we
estimate only the means and the variances of the distributions of w's
and v's. This is known as the error component model, wherein the re-
gression error is assumed to be composed of three components—one as-
sociated with time, another with firms, and the third variable both in
the time and cross-sectional dimensions. The assumptions on the com-
ponents of the error term are that they are independent random variables
with constant variances. Without loss of generality, it is also assumed
that thev have zero means. To estimate the parameters in (7) , gener-
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alized least squares (GLS) can be used. In matrix notation, equation
(7) can be written as:
Y = XB + e (9)
where Y is an NT x 1 vector, the elements of which are the observations
on A(D. /P. ) for N firms in T periods, X is an NT x 3 matrix with one'sit it
in the first column and the observations on (AK. /P. ) and (D. .. /
P. , ) in the second column, e is an NT x 1 vector containing the
l , t l
error terms. Under the assumptions on the error components, the vari-
ance-covariance matrix of the disturbance terms e. is the following NT
x NT matrix:
/
E(ee') = fi = 4s
.
°%
°%
&T
°lh
l
r
.
(10)
where I is a (T x T) identity matrix and A,^ is a (T x T) matrix defined
as:
*T
w
w
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w
2 2 2
in which a is the variance of w. , a is the variance of v . a is the
w iv t u
2 2 2 2
variance of u. , and a = a + a + a . Given equation (10) , it is wellit w v u ^
2 2known that the generalized least squares estimate of B, if o" , a , and
a are known, is
u
= (x'n
-1
x) -1 (X'n
_1
Y) (ID
with variance-covariance matrix
Var (3) = (K'a'h)' 1 (12)
GLS estimates may be more efficient than LSDV or OLS estimates because
they enable us to extract some information about the regression para-
meters from the between group and between time-period variations. In
finite samples, Nerlove [20] has also found that it produces little
bias.
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In actuality a , a and a are usually unknown, but they can be
' W V u '
estimated by the analysis of covariance techniques as follows (see, for
example, Amemiya [1]):
f2
"2
a =
u (N-l) (T-l)
"2 1
a
w
=
T (N-l)T
N T
Z Z
i=l t=l
N
Z
T N
~2 1
°v
=
N N(T-l) t-l Vi-1
i=l \t=l
T
Z
- a
"2
a
u
(13)
(14)
(15)
where e represents residuals obtained by applying the least squares
method to the pooled data, assuming that w. and v are constants to be
estimated rather than random variables.
2 2
If a and a are estimated to equal zero, then Q in (10) is a NT x
NT identity matrix and hence equations (11) and (12) are the same as the
2 2OLS estimators. On the other hand, if the estimate of a la approaches
"2
one and a approaches zero, equations (11) and (12) are equivalent to
"2 "2 "2
LSDV with firm dummies; if a /a approaches one and a approaches zero,
they are equivalent to LSDV with time dummies. Hence in applying GLS
rather than OLS or LSDV, the existence of other time or firm effects can
be determined by the sample rather than assumed and the relative weights
given to between and within firm and time-period variations for the
estimation of the parameters are determined by the data. In OLS it is
assumed that the between and within variations are just added up; in
LSDV the between variation is completely ignored. (See Maddala [17],
pp. 341-344).
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III. Empirical Results
The data for this study is taken from the 1977 annual industrial
file of the Compustat tapes. The tapes contain data for 20 years
(1958-1977) . Since data for 1977 are incomplete for most of the firms
and data for the first two years are lost due to the need to take the
lags of the variables, the sample period of this study is 17 years
(1960-1976). The variables in equation (7) are measured as
D. = Common dividends declared on the common stock of company
i in year t.
P = Net income less preferred dividend requirements, which is
the net income available for common,
K = Net plant and equipment, which represents gross plant
minus accumulated reserves for depreciation, depletion,
amortization, etc.
The companies listed in the New York Stock Exchange and also in the S &
P 400 Industrial Index are the data base of this study. However, those
companies, which did not have complete data, did not have positive
earnings, or did not pay out dividend in any one year during the sample
period, are excluded from the sample. The actual sample includes 256
8
firms.
Before engaging in regression analysis, all of the firms in the
sample were ranked according to the average annual growth rate of total
assets in the sample period and divided into three groups: the high-
growth group (85 firms) , the middle-growth group (86 firms) and the low-
growth group (8 5 firms). The mean values of payout ratio (D./P.) and
investment-earning ratio (AK./P.) are then calculated for each firm in
16
the sample period. Growth rates and payout ratios for these groups are
listed in Table I. As a preliminary study on the relationship between
dividend and investment decisions of firms, the mean of payout ratio was
regressed on the mean of investment-earning ratio for the groups of
high-growth and low-growth firms. Regression results are presented in
Table II. The table shows that the relationships between D./P. and
AK./P. are strikingly different between the high-growth and low-growth
groups of firms. For low-growth firms, D./P. is negatively and sig-
nificantly affected by AK./P.; and AK./P. alone explains D./P. by almost11 11 r x x
50 percent. For high-growth firms, D./P. and AK./P. are positively and
2 9
significantly related. However, R is only about 6 percent. Such
preliminary results suggest that for low-growth firms dividend decisions
and investment decisions are negatively related, but for high-growth
firms they are not negatively related.
To further study the relationship between dividend and investment
decisions of firms, the error component model discussed in Section II is
applied to the data described above for both high-growth and low-growth
firms, each regression containing 1445 observations (85 firms and 17
years). Estimated results are given in Table III. Those obtained from
OLS and LSDV are also presented in the table for comparison.
Table III reveals that all of the estimated coefficients are sta-
tistically significant at the 0.05 level and that the coefficient for
D.
t
i/P-
t _i
has the correct sign regardless the estimation methods
or the groups of firms considered. Estimated results for the same group
of firms are not sensitive to the estimation methods used. Generally,
the estimates obtained from GLS and LSDV have slightly smaller standard
TABLE I. Growth Rates of Assets and
Payout Ratios by Group of Firms
17
High Middle Low
Growth Firms Growth Firms Growth Firms
Dividend
Payout
Maximum 0.783 0.962 1.505
Ratio Minimum 0.148 0.237 0.248
(mean value in
the sample Mean 0.447 0.527 0.595
period) (standard
error) (0.115) (0.115) (0.155)
Growth rate
of real Maximum 37.15 12.12 8.30
Assets Minimum 12.20 8.32 3.37
(mean percen-
tage annual Mean 16.33 9.96 6.57
growth) (Standard
error) (4.54) (1.10) (3.37)
TABLE II.
Empirical Relationships between the Average
Payout Ratio and the Average Investment-Earning
Ratio of Three Groups of Firms
(Dependent Variable = D./P.)
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Constant AK./P.
1 1
D.W.
Low Growth Firms 0.597
(49.19)
-0.221
(-8.89)
0.488 1.79 85
High Growth Firms 0.434
(32.31)
0.023
(2.29)
0.059 1.74 85
NOTE: D./P. is the mean of payout ratio and AK./P. is the mean of
i i i iinvestment-earnings ratio for ith firm in the sample period. Figures
in partentheses are t ratios. The N is the number of firms in the group,
Indicates that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.05
level.
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TABLE III.
Estimated Results Obtained from
the Pooled Data
D.
(The dependent variable = A ——
)
it
Estimation Method Constant AK. /P.it it D. ,/P.i, t-1 i, t-1
R
2
Low Growth Firms
OLS 0.570 -0.111 -0.884 0.480
(27.92) (-12.36) (-35.31)
LSDV 0.689 -0.108 -0.965 0.499
(5.31) (-11.84) (-36.92)
GLS 0.583 -0.111 -0.904 0.501
(19.86) (-12.42) (36.04)
High Growthi Firms
OLS 0.314 0.051 -0.796 0.792
(35.72) (51.79) (-51.24)
LSDV 0.407 0.053 -0.906 0.860
(9.50) (62.93) (-65.28)
GLS 0.356 0.053 -0.891 0.860
(17.70) (63.01) (-64.95)
NOTE: Both time and firm dummies were included when LSDV was used. The
coefficients for the dummy variables are not presented here to save the
space; they are available from the author. The figures in parentheses
are t-ratios. There are 85 firms and 17 years observations each for both
high-growth and low-growth firms.
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errors than those obtained from OLS. A comparison of the coefficients
of the investment variable for the two groups of firms again discloses
the striking difference in behaviors between low-growth and high-growth
firms regarding dividend and investment decisions. The estimated coef-
ficient of AK. /P. for the low-growth firms is negative and significant
while that for high-growth firms is positive and significant. Such
empirical results conform with the hypothesis that for low-growth firms
dividend and investment decisions are negatively related, but they are
not negatively related for high-growth firms. One of the two theories
explained in the first section, that dividend and investment decisions
of high-growth firms should be negatively related, is thus rejected.
The results suggest that high-growth firms are not likely to reduce the
payout ratio in order to increase investment since such action might
detract from their ability to attract external funds. For low-growth
firms, dividend and investment decisions are negatively related since
they are competing uses of funds. The above results partially contra-
dict with the finding of Fama [9], that dividend and investment deci-
sions of firms are not related. The finding of Dhrymes and Kurz that
the two decisions are negatively related, is not fully supported here
either.
IV. Summary and Conclusion
In the preceding sections, theories on the effect of growth orien-
tation on dividend-investment decisions of firms has been introduced. A
new theoretical model for the study of relationship between dividend and
investment decisions of firms has been presented. The model is based on
21
the partial adjustment model and the signalling- theory approach. The
variables, however, have been normalized by the earnings so that spur-
ious correlation and multicollinearity problems can be avoided or re-
duced. It has also been pointed out that over-emphasizing the inter-
dependence of investment and dividend decisions of a firm and hence
adopting a simultaneous-equation estimation method might create speci-
fication errors and generate biased estimates. Statistical methods for
the estimation of equations from pooled cross-sectional and time-series
data have been introduced. Empirical results have shown that for low-
growth firms the mean values of payout ratios over the sample period are
negatively and significantly related to the mean values of investment-
earning ratios. For high-growth firms, they are positively and sig-
nificantly related. Results obtained from the pooled data also revealed
a positive and significant relationship between dividend decisions and
investment decisions of high-growth firms, and a negative and signifi-
cant relationship between the two decisions of low-growth firms. The
results suggest therefore that for high-growth firms the desire to pay
reasonable dividends and hence signalling earning potentials causes
dividend decisions of such firms not to be adversely affected by invest-
ment decisions, while for low growth firms investment decisions do
adversely affect dividend decisions.
Theoretically, this paper has integrated the "information content"
argument with "flotation cost argument" to derive an indicator for ex-
plaining the generalized interaction relationship between the dividend
decisions and investment decisions. The applications of this new model
for forecasting dividends and explaining Shiller's [22] findings about
22
the relationship between the stock price and the change of dividends
will be explored in the future research. It might also be useful to
integrate the new model derived in this paper to generalize the empiri-
cal results obtained by Lee and Djarraya [15]. »
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FOOTNOTES
1. See Fama [9], Brictain [6], Fama and Babiak [10], Mayer and Kuh
[18], Dhrymes and Kurz[8], and others.
2. These variables are the same as those used in Fama [9]. They
will be defined more precisely in Section III.
3. For a discussion of the robustness of the OLS method, see
Maddala [17, p. 231].
4. For a study on investment behavior, see Jorgenson [11].
5. The firm effect refers to the effect of factors affecting the
behavior of an individual firm; it is constant over time. The time effect
refers to the economic condition of particular time point; it varies over
time.
6. For studies of this sort see, for example, Balestra and Nerlove
[2], Wallace and Hussain [24], Maddala [17], and Chang and Lee [7].
7. The Compustat tapes are documented in the Compustat Manual
,
supplied by Standard & Poor's Compustate Services, Inc., 7400 S. Alton
Court, Englewood, Colorado 80112.
8. A list of these firms is available from the author.
9. To investigate the effect of high payout and low payout in capi-
tal asset pricing, Bar-Yosef and Kolodny [3] and Lee and Chang [14] have
used the same method to reduce (or eliminate) the classification errors.
We use a similar method to perform our empirical studies.





[CKMAN
,DERY INC.
JUN95
T „„» N.MANCHESTER.•ToPlorf- |N0 |ANA 46962 J

